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This paper considers the general rationale for cost recovery pricing in respect 
of water services and examines the specific provision that is made for this, 
and related obligations, in Article 9 of the European Community Water 
Framework Directive.  Despite guidance drawn from the Common 
Implementation Strategy, uncertainties remain, particularly with regard to the 
need to recover environmental and resource costs and how account should 
be taken of the polluter pays principle.  Given the intractable character of 
these difficulties, it is suggested that the some of the practical outcomes and 
environmental benefits of implementation are speculative.   
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1. Purpose of Paper 
 
The Water Framework Directive1 must be placed somewhere near the ‘high 
water mark’ of European Community environmental legislation in respect of its 
many innovative features and general ambitiousness.  As commentators have 
observed, ‘it is the most significant piece of European environmental 
legislation ever introduced’.2  Largely, the elevated status of the Directive 
arises from the holistic river basin district approach to the management of 
waters and aquatic ecosystems that it adopts, and the exacting sequence of 
administrative actions that are required to achieve its environmental 
objectives by stated deadlines.  Most prominent amongst these is the 
objective of achieving good chemical and ecological status for all relevant 
waters by 2015.   
 
Although the quest for realisation of good water status may be widely seen as 
the focal point of the WFD, the mechanisms for achieving this involve a 
distinctive combination of legal and economic approaches towards water 
management.  The programmes of measures that are needed to secure 
                                            
An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the Academy of European Law Annual 
Conference on European Water Management Law, Brussels, 23 to 24 April 2009.  The author 
is grateful to participants at the Conference who offered valuable comment on the issues 
raised, but the views expressed are those of the author alone.   
 
1 Directive 2000/60/EC establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water 
policy, OJ L327/1 22 December 2000, hereafter ‘WFD’.   
2 Le Quesne and Green [6].   
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realisation of good status envisage both traditional kinds of legal prohibition 
and restriction of environmentally damaging activities alongside the use of 
economic approaches and instruments.  For the present discussion, emphasis 
is placed upon the role of cost recovery in respect of water services as an 
element in the overall strategy of the WFD and the wider implications of this 
for the Community’s environment policy.   
 
Hence, the main purpose of this paper is to provide an exposition of the 
background, content and interpretation of Article 9 WFD.  Article 9 is primarily 
concerned with obligations in respect of cost recovery pricing for water 
services, incentives for efficient water use in pricing policies and adequate 
contributions by water users to the costs of water services.3  Following 
introductory discussion of the general rationale for cost recovery in relation to 
water services, an analysis is given of the provision for this in the Directive 
and discussion is provided of the uncertainties that surround its interpretation 
and implementation.   
 
Given the relatively terse statement of the water services cost recovery 
obligations in Article 9 WFD, the practicalities of implementation will be greatly 
influenced by guidance that has been formulated at Community level.  Here 
again, the WFD is set apart from previous Community environmental 
legislation in the emphasis that is placed upon the role of guidance in securing 
coherent and harmonised implementation across the Member States.  The 
Common Implementation Strategy for the WFD has resulted in the publication 
of a range of guidance documents indicating a common approach that 
member states should adopt towards various technical and practical aspects 
of interpretation and implementation of the Directive.  Most pertinently for the 
present discussion, specific guidance has been provided on the 
implementation of the water services cost recovery obligations.  Whilst the 
guidance documents are without legal authority, they are of considerable 
practical importance for those entrusted with the task of implementing the cost 
recovery obligations.   
 
Despite valuable insights that may be drawn from the guidance documents, 
several aspects of the water services cost recovery obligations remain 
unclear.  Particular difficulties are seen to arise in the interpretation and 
application of the obligation to recover ‘environmental and resource costs’ of 
water services and in the need to take account of the polluter pays principle.4  
Because the PPP is undefined, and capable of being interpreted in markedly 
different ways, there are major uncertainties as to how it should be ‘taken into 
account’ in applying the water services cost recovery obligations.  Given the 
intractable character of the difficulties, it is suggested that some of the 
practical outcomes and environmental benefits of implementation of Article 9 
WFD are speculative.   
 
2. The Rationale for Cost Recovery 
                                            
3 Recognising that Article 9 WFD provides for three distinct substantive obligations, these are 
collectively referred to in the following discussion as ‘water service cost recovery obligations’.  
Key academic literature on Article 9 WFD includes Unnerstall [9] and Assimacopoulos [1]  
4 Hereafter, ‘PPP’.    
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A natural starting point for the discussion is to consider the fundamental 
rationale for applying an environmental cost recovery approach in relation to 
the services of supplying water and treating waste water.  Why should the 
price of water services seek to incorporate not only their financial cost, but 
also their environmental cost?  An instinctive feeling is that the price of any 
product should reflect both the costs of its production and the adverse impacts 
of the production process upon the environment.  Producers should not be 
allowed to cause environmental damage with impunity and, as a matter of 
fairness, the cost of that damage should be met by either the producer or the 
eventual consumer of the product.  However, as the first recital to the WFD 
reminds us, ‘water is not a commercial product like any other but, rather, a 
heritage which must be protected, defended and treated as such’.5  If so, do 
the same considerations apply?  Why should the price of water be determined 
by reference to the cost of actions that fail to protect that heritage and how 
should the price of a ‘heritage’ (as opposed to any other kind of ‘product’) be 
determined? 
 
In addressing these questions, some useful insights may be gained from the 
Commission Communication on Pricing Policies for Enhancing the 
Sustainability of Water Resources,6 which preceded the adoption of the WFD.  
The purpose of the Communication was to present the justification for use of 
economic and environmental principles in water pricing policies, in furtherance 
of the need for more sustainable use of water resources, and to offer 
guidelines to policymakers for the development of such policies.   
 
In the view of the Commission, there was evidence of alarming misuse of 
water resources in the Community, both in respect of excessive abstraction 
and water pollution.  Quantitatively, serious concerns surrounded over-
abstraction, resulting in loss of wetlands and salinisation of aquifers, and 
ecological degradation due to diminished river flows.  Qualitatively, there was 
evidence of heavily polluted rivers and increases in diffuse pollution, 
particularly in nitrate contamination, posing a hazard to health where water 
was used for supply purposes.  These concerns were seen to be 
consequence of the failure of water pricing policies to give the ‘right signal’ to 
water users or to encourage the sustainable use of water.   
 
The general lack of integration between economic and environmental 
objectives in water pricing was seen to be evident across the Community, with 
marked differences both within national approaches and across different 
economic sectors.  For example, in Southern European countries, suffering 
the greatest water scarcity problems, the agricultural sector was identified as 
the largest and least efficient water consumer, yet agriculture paid much lower 
water prices than other sectors as a result of direct subsidies and cross-
subsidies.   
 
                                            
5 Recital 1 WFD.   
6 European Commission, Communication on Pricing Policies for Enhancing the Sustainability 
of Water Resources COM(2000) 477 and see Water Pricing Policies in theory and practice – 
SEC(2000) 1238. 
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In the opinion of the Commission, the appropriate response towards these 
concerns was to move water pricing polices towards greater sustainability, by 
requiring each user to pay the full costs resulting from water use, both in 
respect of its quantitative and qualitative impacts.  Efficient water pricing 
policies have a demonstrable impact on water demand, sending the right price 
signal to water users and providing a clear incentive for users to improve 
efficiency of water use and to reduce water pollution.  Nonetheless, it was 
recognised that the incentive effect of cost recovery pricing was greatly 
dependent upon the price elasticity of water demand and pollution damage 
costs.  Creating a desired level of incentive would require a systematic 
assessment of the impact of pricing upon the main economic sectors under 
different hydrological and socio-economic conditions.   
 
As well as creating an incentive for more efficient use of water, cost recovery 
might also be seen as a mechanism for producing revenue to rectify the cost 
of environmental damage arising from water use.  If that is what was 
envisaged, there would need to be a mechanism to ensure that payments 
made in respect of an adverse an environmental impact should actually be 
used to rectify that impact and not used for other purposes.  The Commission 
did not address the hypothecation aspect of cost recovery in any detail, but 
acknowledged that ‘there is a need to ensure that the financial revenue from 
the recovery of environmental and resource costs is used efficiently in the 
case of earmarking’.  Notably, no explicit provision for the allocation of 
recovered water service costs is made in the WFD.   
 
More specifically, the Commission proposed that cost recovery water pricing 
policies would need to reflect three different kinds of cost: financial costs of 
providing water services; environmental costs (of damage to water 
environment); and resource costs (of foregone opportunities, where water 
used for one purpose is unavailable for a more beneficial use).  Assessment 
of each of these gives rise to difficulties, both in respect of information 
availability and methodology.  With regard to financial costs, accounting rules 
in different member states give rise to differing ways of assessing water 
service costs and a common approach is needed to facilitate comparisons.  
The assessment of environmental and resource costs (and benefits) was 
seen to represent a particular challenge.  Existing methodologies for the 
monetary valuation of environmental and resource costs, and more 
particularly ecology-related environmental costs, were not seen as sufficiently 
robust and in need of further development.  Also, there were recognised to be 
potential difficulties of comparability in respect of the levels at which the 
different kinds of cost are assessed.  Financial costs are most readily 
assessed at the level of water service providers, whereas environmental and 
resource costs are better assessed through impacts which occur at a river 
basin level.  Notably, these areas are not co-extensive.   
 
Alongside the potential implementation challenges of establishing cost 
recovery pricing for water services, it was also seen to raise sensitive social 
and economic issues.  Stringent application of cost recovery for water 
services would be likely to affect their affordability, particularly for low-income 
groups and rural communities.  The Commission was appreciative of these 
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sensitivities, but took the view that social concerns should be addressed 
through social measures, rather than water prices.  It was suggested that 
initiatives such as ‘rising block pricing’ policies might combine affordability 
with economic efficiency.  Nonetheless, ex-ante and ex-post assessment of 
both the social welfare effects and impacts on household water demand of 
such pricing policies were seen as necessary to ensure that both social and 
environmental objectives are met.   
 
The Commission also recognised the limitations of cost recovery water pricing 
in emphasising that cost recovery is not a ‘pricing alone’ policy, but needs to 
operate in conjunction with supplementary measures.  These might include, 
promotion of water saving devices and practices, reduction of water leakage 
in the production-supply-distribution systems, or education and public 
information campaigns.  Integration would also be needed between cost 
recovery pricing and related measures to ensure environmental, economic 
and social objectives are met cost effectively.  The proposed WFD (as it then 
was) was seen as offering a framework for this to be done, through the 
preparation of the river basin management plans, but the consistency and 
coherence of other policies also needed to be addressed.  Hence, other 
sector, structure and cohesion policies needed to be designed and 
implemented so as to ensure compatibility with sustainable water pricing 
policies.  In particular, reconciling water policy and agriculture water use was 
seen to be a key priority for the Common Agriculture Policy.   
 
Despite the potentially problematic issues that were acknowledged in the 
Commission Communication, the overall commitment to cost recovery pricing 
as a means of enhancing the sustainability of water use was emphatic.  The 
general legitimacy of using economic instruments to address environmental 
concerns has been internationally affirmed by the 1992 Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development.  Principle 16 of this states that  
 
National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalisation of environmental 
costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the 
polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution with due regard to the public 
interest and without distorting trade and investment. 
 
At European Community level, the EC Treaty incorporates the polluter pays 
principle as a foundation of the Community’s environment policy.7  Whilst 
recognising that only limited progress had been made in the actual application 
of economic instruments so far, the Commission was firmly of the view that 
introducing cost recovery water pricing, under the proposed WFD, would be 
an appropriate application of the polluter pays principle.  This view prevailed 
and cost recovery water pricing is now provided for in Article 9 of the WFD.   
 
3. Economic Approaches to Water Management in the WFD 
 
Cost recovery pricing for water services needs to be placed in the context of a 
Directive that is remarkable for the innovative use that it makes of economic 
approaches to environmental management.  Amongst the many novel aspects 
                                            
7 Article 174(2) EC Treaty, discussed below. 
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of the WFD is the groundbreaking use that it makes of economic approaches 
towards water management.  Recital 38 notes, first, the appropriateness of 
economic instruments in programmes of measures, directed at realising the 
environmental objectives of the WFD; second, the need for cost recovery in 
relation to water services, in accordance with the polluter pays principle; and, 
third, the need for an economic analysis of water services as a precursor to 
implementing cost recovery.   
 
Article 5(1) WFD requires member states, amongst other things, to conduct 
an economic analysis of water use for each river basin district, and for each 
portion of an international river basin district, within their territory.  The initial 
economic analysis, which was required by 2004, was to be undertaken in 
accordance with technical specifications set out in Annex III to the WFD.  
Annex III makes it apparent that the purposes of the economic analysis are 
twofold.  The analysis should contain: first, sufficiently detailed information to 
make relevant calculations and estimates of the volumes, costs and prices 
associated with water services and information about investments for the 
purpose of implementing cost recovery obligations (under Article 9); and, 
second, information needed to make judgements about the most cost 
effective programme of measures to be adopted (under Article 11).   
 
Articles 9 and 11 WFD are closely linked.  The ‘basic measures’, as the 
minimum requirements needed to secure the environmental objectives (under 
Article 4) are to include ‘measures deemed appropriate for the purposes of 
Article 9’.  That is to say that water service cost recovery is an integral part of 
what is required by way of administrative actions to achieve the environmental 
objectives of the WFD.  Whilst recognising the broader implications, attention 
here needs to be focused more specifically upon the meaning and 
implications of the cost recovery obligations.   
 
4. The Content of Article 9 
 
Article 9 WFD, on cost recovery for water services, is a deceptively brief 
provision which gives rise to issues and complexities that are as profound and 
far reaching as anything found elsewhere in the WFD.  In summary, its 
content may usefully be divided into five key elements: 
1. Recovery of the costs of water services; 
2. Ensuring incentives in water pricing; 
3. Ensuring adequate contributions by water users; 
4. Having regard to social, environmental and economic effects; and 
5. Reporting on implementation.   
 
4.1. Recovery of the costs of water services; 
 
Article 9(1) provides as follows.   
 
Member States shall take account of the principle of recovery of the costs of water 
services, including environmental and resource costs, having regard to the 
economic analysis conducted according to Annex III, and in accordance in 
particular with the polluter pays principle. 
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In contrast to the later provision for incentives in water pricing, this paragraph 
takes effect from 2003, the date when the WFD should have been transposed 
into national law.  However, given that the economic analysis was not 
required until 2004, it may be seen as having a progressive but continuing 
effect.  As more detailed and specific information becomes available the need 
to ‘have regard’ to the specified matters becomes more substantial and 
demanding.   
 
Significantly, however cost recovery is formulated as a relatively weak 
obligation upon member states.  The requirement, to ‘have regard to’ the 
specified matters indicates that a high level of national discretion is allowed, 
with a consequent difficulty in showing a contravention of this requirement.  
Nonetheless, the progressive and continuing character of the obligation may 
be significant in the interpretation of other parts of the Article and the WFD 
more generally.   
 
On the meaning of ‘water services’, Article 2(38) provides the following 
definition. 
 
‘Water services’ means all services which provide, for households, public 
institutions or any economic activity: 
(a) abstraction, impoundment, storage, treatment and distribution of surface water 
or groundwater, 
(b) waste-water collection and treatment facilities which subsequently discharge 
into surface water. 
 
Hence, adequate recovery of ‘water service’ costs means recovery of those 
costs that are incurred in the wide range of activities involved in the provision 
of water supplies and the treatment of wastewater.  This seems to encompass 
the recovery of costs for everything done by a body entrusted with water utility 
responsibilities, from the point where raw water is directed from the natural 
water environment to the point where treated wastewater is returned to that 
environment.   
 
4.2. Ensuring incentives in water pricing 
 
The second element in Article 9(1) is formulated as a more substantial kind of 
legal obligation, the achievement of which is stated more categorically.   
 
Member States shall ensure by 2010 
- that water-pricing policies provide adequate incentives for users to use water 
resources efficiently, and thereby contribute to the environmental objectives of this 
Directive . . .  
 
The need to ‘ensure’ adequate incentives in water pricing will require 
particular measures to be taken to achieve this, subject to the discretion to 
have regard to the qualifications set out later in the Article, discussed below.  
Recalling the previous observations of the Commission, the difference 
between cost recovery in water pricing and the need for adequate incentives 
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for efficient use should be noted.  Critically, what constitutes an ‘adequate 
incentive’ will depend upon considerations of price elasticity and the sensitivity 
of different users to different levels of pricing, matters which the Commission 
recognised would require systematic assessment of the impacts of different 
levels of pricing.   
 
On the meaning of ‘water use’, Article 2(39) provides the following definition. 
 
‘Water use’ means water services together with any other activity identified under 
Article 5 and Annex II having a significant impact on the status of water. 
This concept applies for the purposes of Article 1 and of the economic analysis 
carried out according to Article 5 and Annex III, point (b). 
 
From this definition, it is to be noted that ‘water use’ is a wider concept than 
‘water service’.  ‘Water uses’ encompass the provision of water services, but 
may also extend to any other kind of activity that significantly impacts upon 
the status of waters within the WFD.  Potentially, the range of possible ‘water 
uses’ is open-ended, but the definition limits its possible breadth by making 
reference to activities that have been identified under the review of the 
pressures and impacts of human activity.   
 
Article 5, amongst other things, requires a review of the impact of human 
activity on the status of surface waters and groundwater, and this review must 
be undertaken in accordance with technical specifications set out in Annex II.  
Annex II8 requires an identification and review of all significant anthropogenic 
pressures upon surface waters and groundwaters.  For this purpose, member 
states are required to gather information on the type and magnitude of 
significant anthropogenic pressures within each river basin district.  For 
surface waters, this involves identification and assessment of impact of 
significant point source and diffuse source pollution (particularly, where these 
are provided for under other Directives), abstraction, flow regulation, 
morphological alteration and other anthropogenic impacts, extending to land 
use patterns.  For groundwaters, a range of quantitative and qualitative 
aspects are to be reviewed, particularly where groundwater is considered to 
be at risk of failing to meet the environmental objectives of the WFD.  In part, 
the purpose of these assessments is to inform the process of establishing an 
appropriate programme of measures for each river basin district.  Equally, the 
assessments are significant for the purpose of ascertaining the contribution 
that significant ‘water uses’ make to the cost of provision of water services.  In 
short, if an activity is identified as imposing a significant anthropogenic 
pressure upon waters, it falls within the scope of a ‘water use’ for water 
service cost recovery purposes.   
 
4.3. Ensuring adequate contributions by water users 
 
The third element under Article 9(1) is provided for as follows. 
 
Member States shall ensure by 2010 
                                            
8 Particularly, paras. 1.4 to 1.5 and 2.3 to 2.5.   
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- an adequate contribution of the different water uses, disaggregated into at least 
industry, households and agriculture, to the recovery of the costs of water services, 
based on the economic analysis conducted according to Annex III and taking 
account of the polluter pays principle. 
 
Again, this provision is concerned with ‘water uses’, in the wide sense that this 
has been indicated above, and requires those making such uses to contribute 
to the costs that they impose upon water services.  Significantly, it extends 
beyond situations where payments are made for water services.  Hence, 
where an activity gives rise to an increased cost to a water service provider, 
there is an obligation to ensure that those engaged in the activity make a 
corresponding contribution to meet that increased cost.  A degree of 
averaging is envisaged in ensuring adequate contributions of this kind, in that 
recovery is to be from at least the sectors of activity that are identified, 
industry, households and agriculture.  Nonetheless, the obligation envisages 
that the respective contributions of these three sectors to the increased water 
service costs will be ascertained and those engaged in the sectors will, 
collectively, be required to meet their respective shares of the costs.   
 
4.4. Social, Environmental and Economic Effects. 
 
The requirements for cost recovery, incentive pricing and adequate 
contributions set out in Article 9(1) of the WFD are not unqualified.  The 
requirements are subject a widely formulated statement that, in ensuring 
these requirements are met by 2010,  
 
Member States may . . . . have regard to the social, environmental and economic 
effects of the recovery as well as the geographic and climatic conditions of the 
region or regions affected. 
 
The need to have regard to social, environmental and economic effects is 
admirably consonant with the imperative of sustainable development.  
However, the facility that this offers for member states to subsidise water 
charges for vulnerable groups on grounds of affordability remains to be 
tested.  Given the comments in the Commission’s Communication, the 
reduction of water charges for social purposes would seem to be limited to 
situations where provision of this kind cannot be made by social measures.   
 
Article 9(3) provides that,  
 
Nothing in this Article shall prevent the funding of particular preventive or remedial 
measures in order to achieve the objectives of this Directive. 
 
Again, this provision appears to be of potentially broad application.  One 
possibility is that this might be interpreted to allow state-funded measures for 
the remediation of land or water that has been contaminated by past use, 
particularly in relation to ‘historic’ contamination, where the polluter no longer 
exists.  Given that the definition of ‘water use’ is couched in the present tense, 
concerned with activities ‘having a significant impact on the status of water’, it 
might be argued that past activities, that are no longer being undertaken, 
might fall outside the scope of ‘water use’.  If so, the need for present 
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remedial measures to address the continuing impacts of past activities might 
fall outside the cost recovery obligations, making the need for other 
mechanisms in relation to historic contamination critically important.   
 
Article 9(4) provides that,  
 
Member States shall not be in breach of this Directive if they decide in accordance 
with established practices not to apply the provisions of paragraph 1, second 
sentence [concerned with incentive pricing and adequate contributions], and for that 
purpose the relevant provisions of paragraph 2, for a given water-use activity, 
where this does not compromise the purposes and the achievement of the 
objectives of this Directive. . . . 
 
Again, the potential scope of this is rather open-ended.  One possibility might 
be that a member state envisages an alternative, but equally effective, means 
of addressing an environmental problem.  Prohibiting an activity, as opposed 
to charging for it, might be an illustration of something coming within this 
provision for alternative approaches.   
 
The upshot of these various qualifications to the obligations in respect of cost 
recovery, incentive pricing and appropriate contributions is that there may be 
quite wide scope for member states to depart from these obligations.  Cost 
recovery does not seem to be required outside the sphere of water services or 
where an activity has an environmental impact outside the water environment.  
Even within the scope of water services, member states are allowed to have 
regard to ‘social, environmental and economic’ effects in determining how 
cost recovery is to be applied and may, it seems, opt to address particular 
impacts otherwise than through application of the cost recovery mechanism.   
 
4.5. Reporting on Implementation 
 
In each instance of derogation from the basic obligations of cost recovery, 
incentive pricing and appropriate contributions, there is a requirement of 
transparency in reporting the extent to which the obligations are not fully 
applied.  Reporting on this is to be provided in river basin management plans, 
where appropriate, giving the reasons for non application of the obligations.  
The need for transparency in respect of the practical implementation of the 
obligations is provided for in Article 9(4) by the requirement that,  
 
. . . Member States shall report the reasons for not fully applying paragraph 1, second 
sentence [concerned with incentive pricing and adequate contributions], in the river 
basin management plans. 
 
Further reporting requirements are provided for in Article 9(2).   
 
Member States shall report in the river basin management plans on the planned 
steps towards implementing paragraph 1 which will contribute to achieving the 
environmental objectives of this Directive and on the contribution made by the 





In reviewing the main elements of Article 9, some of the inherent difficulties 
have been glossed over for the purposes of the initial exposition.  Three 
points are especially problematic and require further consideration: first, the 
meaning of ‘the costs of water services’; second, the meaning of 
‘environmental and resource costs’; and, third, the need for cost recovery and 
appropriate contributions to be required in ‘accordance with the polluter pays 
principle’.  On the meanings of these critically important expressions, the 
WFD is silent.  Insights as to what might be intended, however, may be drawn 
from non-legal guidance on the implementation of the Directive.   
 
5.1 The Common Implementation Strategy Guidance 
 
The WFD is set apart from other European Community environmental 
legislation by the unprecedented emphasis that has been placed upon various 
forms of guidance as to its interpretation and application.  Recognising the 
challenges raised by the WFD, in respect of its demanding timetable for 
interpretation, the complexity of the text and the need for scientific and 
technical capacity building, a Common Implementation Strategy has been 
established at Community level.9  Whilst stressing that the final responsibility 
for implementation resides with the member states, the aim of the Strategy is 
to enable a coherent and harmonious implementation of the WFD through 
agreement of a common understanding on the approach that needs to be 
adopted.  This is facilitated through the provision of supporting technical and 
scientific information to assist in the various aspects of implementation.  This 
guidance is intended as practical advice to the various persons and bodies 
entrusted with the task of implementing the WFD in the member states.  For 
that reason, it tends to adopt a pragmatic tone, avoiding legal or academic 
analysis of the areas of potential uncertainty in the legal text.  It is emphasised 
that the guidance formulated under the Strategy is of an informal and non-
legally binding character, but it is of considerable significance nonetheless.   
 
In furtherance of the Strategy, working groups have been established to 
prepare guidance documents on key aspects of the WFD, with priority being 
given to coverage of those activities needing to be undertaken in the early 
phases of implementation.  Most pertinent, for this discussion, is the work of 
working group established to develop guidance on economic analysis 
(WATECO (on Water and Economics)) led by France and the European 
Commission, which has produced overall guidance on Economics and the 
Environment.10  In several respects this overall guidance on economic 
analysis has been supplemented by two information sheets, prepared by 
other groups working on the Strategy.  The first Information Sheet is on 
Assessment of the Recovery of Costs for Water Services and the second on 
                                            
9 Generally, see European Commission, Common Implementation Strategy for the Water 
Framework Directive (2000/60/EC): Strategic Document (2001) available at 
http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/env/wfd/library?l=/framework_directive&vm=detailed&sb=Title 
10 European Commission, Common Implementation Strategy for the Water Framework 
Directive (2000/60/EC) Guidance Document No. 1 Economics and the environment: the 
implementation challenge of the Water Framework Directive (2003) available at 
http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/env/wfd/library?l=/framework_directive&vm=detailed&sb=Title 
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Assessment of Environmental and Resource Costs.11  Insights into the 
interpretation and implementation of Article 9 WFD drawn from these 
guidance documents are recounted in the subsections that follow.   
 
5.2. The WATECO Guidance 
 
The principal WATECO Guidance document was prepared with particular 
emphasis upon the 2004 reporting requirements (under Article 5) but provides 
some broader observation on the role of economics in water management 
which are of significance in relation to implementation of the cost recovery 
obligations.  The guidance notes the need for economic analysis of the most 
significant water uses within a river basin district and suggests various 
elements should be investigated in estimating the current (2004) level of cost 
recovery.  These include matters such as socio-economic indicators, sectoral 
policies, land planning, implementation of existing water regulation and other 
environmental policies.  However, the general message is that the 2004 
reporting was required to be explicit about the limitations in the information 
available, the assumptions and approaches that underlie the reports, and 
other uncertainties.  These are matters needing to be returned to at a later 
stage, particularly in relation to the implementation of the 2010 cost recovery 
obligations.   
 
Perhaps most pertinently for the present discussion, the WATECO guidance 
highlights several unresolved issues requiring further research and analysis.  
Amongst the matters requiring methodological development is that of how to 
assess environmental and resource costs: how can methods for assessing 
environment costs (developed at an academic level) be made operational in 
the context of the development of river basin management plans?  This 
question, along with the more general issue of how to assess the costs of 
water services, have been returned to in subsequent information sheets 
prepared as a part of the Common Implementation Strategy.   
 
5.3. Information Sheet on Assessment of Costs for Water Services 
 
The issue of assessment of the recovery of costs for water services in the 
2004 Article 5 Reports was revisited in the Information sheet prepared by the 
Drafting Group ECO1 under the Common Implementation Strategy Working 
Group 2B, on Assessment of the Recovery of Costs for Water Services for the 
2004 River Basin Characterisation Report (Art 9) which sought to build upon 
the WATECO guidance.  The Information Sheet raised several key issues on 
the implementation of cost recovery pricing for water services.  Specifically, 
issues were identified concerning the form of ‘adequate incentive pricing’, the 
assessment of ‘adequate contribution of the different water users’ and, 
                                            
11 Particularly, European Commission, Common Implementation Strategy, Working Group 2B: 
Drafting Group ECO1, Information Sheet on Assessment of the Recovery of Costs for Water 
Services for the 2004 River Basin Characterisation Report (Art 9) (2004) and Information 
Sheet on the Assessment of Environmental and Resource Costs in the Water Framework 
Directive (2004), available at 
http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/env/wfd/library?l=/framework_directive&vm=detailed&sb=Title 
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perhaps more fundamentally, the meaning of the ‘polluter pays principle’ in 
the context of cost recovery.   
 
Nonetheless, the Information Sheet does not dwell on the points of 
uncertainty.  It adopts a strongly practical (‘what to do’ and ‘how to do it’) tone 
in dividing the exercise of assessing levels of cost recovery into a sequence of 
seven key tasks: 
1. Define the water services; 
2. Identify providers, users and polluters; 
3. Calculate the financial cost of water services; 
4. Identify and estimate environmental and resource costs; 
5. Identify the cost recovery mechanism; 
6. Calculate the rate of cost recovery; and 
7. Identify the allocation of costs to users and polluters.   
 
First, on the definition of ‘water services’, it is noted the WFD does not state 
whether this encompasses both public and private water services, whether it 
applies to self-supply (where water is used by the person that abstracts it, as 
is common in agricultural water use) or whether private treatment of 
wastewater comes within the definition.  It is suggested that these kinds of 
uncertainties can be resolved by reference to the pressures and impacts 
study (under Article 5).  That is, the appropriate water services to include are 
those that are identified as having a significant impact on the status of water 
bodies.   
 
Second, the identification of ‘providers’, involves listing the various 
organisations that provide water and wastewater treatment services.  In some 
jurisdictions, this may involve different bodies having responsibility for 
different services.  In others (such as England and Wales) single privatised 
water companies have comprehensive responsibilities for water services, 
though their boundaries do not necessarily correspond with river basin 
districts and geographical adjustments may be needed to take account of this.  
Data on self-services, including abstraction by users and private wastewater 
treatment, was recognised to be less readily available, and may have needed 
to be estimated for the 2004 Reports, with further post-2004 work being 
undertaken to refine these estimates.   
 
‘Water uses’, following the WFD definition, encompasses those engaged in 
any activity having a significant impact upon the status of water including, as a 
minimum, households, agriculture and industry.  For the purpose of the 2004 
reports, it was not necessary to disaggregate the three categories of user, but 
this will be required from 2010 to meet the cost recovery obligation.  
Nonetheless, identifying ‘water uses’ will involve collection and/or collation of 
considerable amounts of data on populations served, volumes of water 
supplied and volumes of wastewater treated.   
 
‘Polluters’ is broadly understood to encompass those whose actions give rise 
to a cost in respect of water services.  For example, this would arise where a 
person’s actions involve the transmission of a contaminant into water that is 
subsequently used for supply purposes, so that the contaminant needs to be 
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removed before the water is supplied to consumers.  Again, the identification 
of ‘polluters’ is closely linked to the pressures and impacts survey, but it is 
recognised that this may need to be augmented to take account of historic 
pollution.  Where past polluting activities give rise to continuing remediation 
costs for water service providers these need to be identified, if not within the 
2004 reports, then subsequently.  Clearly, cost recovery from entities that 
have ceased to exist, but whose activities cause continuing contamination to 
water quality, raises considerable logistical problems.  How these problems 
are to be addressed is not clearly indicated in the guidance.   
 
The third task is the calculation of financial costs of providing water services 
and administering these services.  The Information Sheet suggests these 
should encompass four kinds of cost: operating costs, capital costs, 
administrative costs, and taxes and subsidies.   
‘Operating costs’ are the costs of providing the services, including the 
employment, energy and maintenance costs of bodies engaged in water 
supply and wastewater treatment.   
‘Capital costs’ are the costs of expenditure on assets that are funded by loans 
and interest payable on principle amounts that are borrowed.  The calculation 
of this raises some intricate issues in respect of the allowances that are made 
for depreciation of assets over time, and further work is likely to be needed to 
agree upon common methods for calculating depreciation across different 
member states.   
‘Administrative costs’ relate to the costs of regulating water service provision, 
for example, through charges to water service providers for abstraction 
licences and permits to discharge waste water.   
On ‘taxes and subsidies’ a distinction needs to be drawn between general 
taxes (for example, on corporate profits) and environmental taxes (that are 
imposed in relation to meeting the cost of environmental damage).  Subsidies 
may be of a direct or indirect form, but invariably entail the provision of a 
financial benefit to a water service provider which avoids a cost being 
transferred to customers.  Clearly, subsidies that undermine full cost recovery 
for water services will be incompatible with post-2010 implementation of 
Article 9 but, for the purpose of the 2004 reports, the aim was merely to 
identify and quantify levels of subsidies for the purpose of calculating the 
current level of cost recovery.   
 
Fourth, identification and estimation of the environmental and resource costs 
of water supply is initially problematic because information of this kind has not 
been systematically collected by member states.  For the purpose of the 
Article 5 reports, it was recognised that the collection of this data was 
complex, time consuming and expensive.  Consequently, the best that could 
be expected was an estimate of these costs, with the underlying assumptions 
and uncertainties clearly explained.  It was suggested that, for the purpose of 
the 2004 reports, this could mean that where monetary valuation is not 
possible, these costs should be described in qualitative terms, despite the 
unhelpfulness of this in calculating the precise extent of cost recovery.   
 
Fifth, identification of revenues and the cost recovery mechanism involves 
provision of a statement of the existing charging regime for water services.  In 
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part this was likely to relate to the institutional arrangements for provision of 
water services and payments to the various bodies that are involved.  This 
might also incorporate discussion of the main price-setting mechanisms and 
the regulatory structures for water services.   
 
Sixth, the calculation of cost recovery for economic costs involves the 
assessment of the extent to which economic costs of water services are met 
by charges to water users and other cost recovery mechanisms.  In effect, the 
cost recovery rate will be the total revenue paid by water consumers, less any 
amount provided through subsidies, divided by the total costs of water service 
provision.  This could be stated as an overall percentage figure or the 
corresponding figure per unit of water services (water supplied and 
wastewater treated).   
 
Finally, it was necessary to identify the allocation of water service costs to 
users and polluters.  This involved an assessment of what proportion of the 
costs of water services are used to address pollution and to meet 
environmental and resource costs.  For example, if it is found that a particular 
activity, such as agriculture, is responsible for an identified proportion of the 
pollution in a river basin district, then the aim should be to assess the extent 
to which those engaged in agriculture actually met the cost of pollution 
attributed to their activity.  Clearly, identifying those who have contributed to 
pollution and quantifying the extent of this in terms of its cost is a complex 
exercise.  Although a systematic assessment of these contributions and costs 
will be needed to implement the cost recovery obligation post-2010, it was 
recognised that the Article 5 reports needed to be based only on assumptions 
and ‘expert judgement’, with detailed analysis having to wait until after 2004.   
 
5.4. Illustration: Financial Costs of Water Services in England and Wales   
 
It may be helpful to illustrate the application of the principles for assessment 
of the extent of cost recovery in water services, by looking at the way that they 
were applied in a national context in the 2004 reports.12   
 
By comparison with other member states, water service provision in England 
and Wales is unusual, in that by private water and sewerage companies, 
established under statutory provisions, are responsible for the whole 
sequence of water services: abstraction, treatment of drinking water, 
treatment of wastewater and discharge of treated effluent.  The water industry 
consists of 10 water and sewerage companies and 14 water supply 
companies.  Economic regulation of these companies is provided by the 
Water Service Regulation Authority (OFWAT) which has the duty of ensuring 
that the companies can carry out their functions whilst protecting water 
customers, promoting economy and efficiency and facilitating competition.  
Perhaps most importantly, OFWAT regulates the tariffs that water companies 
are allowed to charge for their services.  Alongside economic regulation of the 
industry, separate regulation of the environmental impacts of water service 
                                            
12 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [4].  Information on agricultural water 
contamination costs used in this report was drawn from Pretty [7].  .   
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provision is provided by the Environment Agency, which has responsibility for 
authorising abstractions and permitting discharges of wastewater.  The quality 
of drinking water at the point of supply is also separately regulated by the 
Drinking Water Inspectorate, within the Department for Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs.   
 
The privatised character of the water industry in England and Wales, should 
have the consequence that cost recovery is comprehensive, at least in 
respect of the financial costs of water service provision.  This is because 
water service prices to customers are set at a level which allows the 
companies fully to recover their costs, plus an amount that OFWAT will accept 
as a ‘reasonable return on capital’.  However, using water company and 
OFWAT data to confirm this situation is not straightforward because 
assessment of cost recovery pricing must be undertaken at a river basin 
district level, whereas the boundaries of water companies bear little 
relationship to the boundaries of river basin districts.  This meant that it was 
necessary to undertake a complex exercise of aggregating water services 
data to attribute populations of water customers to river basin districts, rather 
than water service providers.   
 
The national report followed the Common Implementation Strategy guidance 
in considering four cost components: operating costs, capital costs, 
administrative costs and taxes and subsidies.  The unremarkable overall 
conclusion was that is that there is no subsidy of water services in England 
and Wales.  Given the established policy of OFWAT, to allow full financial cost 
recovery and to avoid cross-subsidies between different customers, as 
expected, the levels of cost recovery for both water supply and sewerage 
services were confirmed to be 100%.   
 
However, one of the most revealing findings from this study was the extent of 
costs attributable to activities external to water services, that is, where water 
service costs incorporate an element to meet a cost generated by another 
sector.  The best examples of this arise where water suppliers are involved in 
expenditure to remove contamination of raw water generated by agriculture.  
Specifically, this is required where capital expenditure for water treatment is 
needed for the removal of nitrate, pesticides or other contaminants, or to 
reduce the risk posed by cryptosporidium originating from animal waste.  In 
England and Wales it was estimated that capital and operating expenditure 
attributable to treating raw water was about £313 million annually, equating to 
about 10% of the total public water supply costs of England and Wales.  
About £220 million of this cost was estimated to be attributable to the external 
impact of the agriculture sector on raw water quality.   
 
This finding raises important questions in relation to the need for an ‘adequate 
contribution’ from agriculture to the cost of water services.  The implication is 
that water supply customers are paying more than they would be if the cost of 
agricultural contamination was met by the agricultural water ‘users’.  
Moreover, the UK government is presently failing to ensure that agriculture 
makes the ‘adequate contribution’ that will be required by 2010.  However, it is 
unclear what mechanisms could be used to recover this adequate 
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contribution.  In part, the problems may be attributable to incomplete national 
implementation of existing Community environmental legislation, particularly 
the Agricultural Nitrates Directive (91/676/EC).  Possibly, a levy on nitrate 
fertiliser or a tax on pesticides might be a means of addressing some aspects 
of the problem, but it is far from clear how cost recovery would be possible in 
relation to other kinds of agricultural impact.13   
 
Even if it were possible to devise an effective and equitable means of 
recovering the additional water treatment cost generated by agricultural 
activity, it is unclear what overall benefits of agricultural cost recovery would 
be.  Some farmers might be willing and able to modify their activities in 
response to new charges, but others would seek to pass these charges on to 
their consumers.  From the perspective of an average household, the 
consequence could be that the price of food might increase by almost as 
much as the cost of water services was reduced, depending upon the extent 
to which farmers sought to pass on their additional costs to their customers.  
Given the limited scope for consumers to stop buying either food or water, 
cost recovery from water users seems capable of generating extraordinarily 
complex legal and administrative challenges for, what may turn out to be, 
comparatively little environmental benefit.   
 
5.5. The Information Sheet on Environmental and Resource Costs 
 
The purpose of the Information Sheet on Environmental and Resources 
Costs, published by the ECO2 drafting group in 2004, was further to 
investigate these concepts in order to make them of practical use in 
developing river basin management plans.  Hence, the Information Sheet 
seeks to define ‘environmental and resource costs’, to identify their role in the 
WFD and to ascertain how they are to be measured in practice.   
 
Following the WATECO guidance, ‘environmental costs’ are defined as 
representing the costs of damage that water uses impose on the environment 
and ecosystems, and those who use the environment.  ‘Resource costs’ are 
defined as the costs of foregone opportunities which others suffer due to the 
depletion of the resource beyond its natural rate of recharge or recovery.   
 
Within the scope of ‘environmental costs’ fall the various kinds of 
environmental and ecological damage that might result from water pollution or 
water use.  These may be subdivided as to whether they have a financial cost 
impact upon others who use, or may use, the environment, termed ‘use-
values’, or whether they relate to impacts upon the environment aside from its 
use value, termed its ‘non-use value’.  Use values, would incorporate the 
diminished value of water for abstraction, water supply or angling, where the 
benefits of water use can, in principle, be fairly readily quantified in financial 
terms.  Non-use values are more difficult to quantify, because they rest on the 
belief that environments and ecosystems are of ‘intrinsic value’ and should be 
conserved for the enjoyment of future generations.  Clearly, putting a price 
                                            
13 For discussion of the challenges of applying the PPP to agricultural activities, see Baldock 
[2] and Seymour, Cox and Lowe [8].   
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upon this non-market value of the environment is an extremely challenging 
exercise.   
 
‘Resource costs’ equate to the opportunity costs involved in using a limited 
resource in a particular way.  This involves a comparison between the overall 
benefits of an existing use of water gauged against the economic value of the 
best current or future alternative use of that water.  Hence, resource costs 
arise as a result of an economically inefficient allocation of water and/or 
pollution over time between different water users, because some alternative to 
the actual use generates a greater economic value.  For example, the current 
use of water for purpose A (receiving industrial effluent), may be less 
economically beneficial that its use for purpose B (water supply), and the 
resource cost will be a long-term measure of this difference.  The resource 
cost drawn from this kind of comparison needs to be separately assessed 
from the environmental costs arising from either kind of activity, since 
comparison between the relative efficiency of different uses bears no clear 
relationship to the environmental damage to which either will give rise.   
 
The concept of ‘environmental costs’ is itself dependent on the idea that an 
activity gives rise to ‘damage’ to the environment and this in itself calls for 
elaboration.  As a theoretical matter, ‘damage’ is seen as arising in a situation 
where there is a discrepancy between some ‘reference’ and ‘target’ point or 
situation.  Generally, the failure of some part of the environment to reach an 
agreed norm or standard would be illustrative of this.  In the context of the 
WFD, the natural target to adopt is that particular waters should achieve their 
relevant environmental status objective, required by the Directive, by 2015.  
The relevant reference point would be the actual or expected status of the 
water in 2015.  If a particular water fails to meet its environmental objective at 
that date, the environmental damage is the difference between its actual state 
and required status under the WFD.   
 
Within the concept of environmental and resource costs a further distinction is 
drawn between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ costs.  A cost is internal when it is met, 
or compensated for, by the person causing it, whereas a cost is external 
where it is not met by the person causing it.  Hence, for example, the 
discharge of wastewater from an industrial installation may have a cost to a 
downstream water user, where it needs to be treated for water supply 
purposes to remove contamination originating from the wastewater.  Insofar 
as this cost is not met by the wastewater discharger, it is an external cost.  To 
the extent that the discharger treats the effluent before discharge, and incurs 
a cost in so doing, that cost is an internal cost.  The discharger has to bear 
these internal environmental costs, usually because of pollution abatement 
requirements in respect of the quality of wastewater that may be discharged.  
However, it may be expected that these costs will be reflected in the price that 
is charged for the product generated by the industrial process.  In relation to 
cost recovery for water services provision, the task is that of identifying 
external environmental resource costs and putting in place mechanisms to 
secure that all external costs are effectively internalised.   
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As has been noted, Article 9 imposes obligations to take account of the 
environmental resource costs in respect of cost recovery for water services 
and (post 2010) to ensure that water prices provide adequate incentives for 
efficient water use.  To implement these obligations it is necessary to 
calculate the total environmental and resource costs involved in providing 
water services and to ascertain the extent to which these are internalised by 
different water users through existing mechanisms.  In effect, full 
implementation of the polluter pays principle is seen to be realised where all 
environmental and resource costs are fully compensated for where there is 
complete internalisation of costs through charges to water users.   
 
The critical difficulties in taking account of environmental costs associated 
with water services and uses lie in the practical task of measuring these.  The 
Information Sheet suggests that the assessment of environmental costs 
involves three elements: assessment of environmental impact; valuation of 
environmental damage; and the institutional and financial assessment of the 
extent to which environmental costs are internalised.   
 
Of these three elements, the most problematic is that of placing a price on 
environmental damage.  The Information Sheet suggests that there are two 
main methods of assessing environment costs, a ‘cost based’ approach and a 
‘benefits based’ approach.  The cost based approach involves an assessment 
of the cost of those measures that may be needed to protect against 
environmental damage.  Hence, in a situation where a particular water fails to 
meet its target environmental objective under the WFD by 2015, a costs 
based assessment of environmental costs would equate the environmental 
damage with the cost of those additional measures that are required to secure 
the target objective.  As it is put, ‘environmental protection costs are used 
under certain circumstances as a proxy for the environmental damage costs’.  
This seems an admirably pragmatic approach, but raises the critical issue of 
whether the PPP is correctly interpreted as requiring the recovery of 
preventative rather than remedial costs, discussed later.   
 
The benefits based approach to assessment of environmental costs is based 
on the ‘loss of welfare’ due to environmental damage.  ‘Loss of welfare’ is a 
rather elusive expression, which encompasses any effect on human well-
being, but it is suggested that this can be estimated through ‘Willingness to 
Pay’ or ‘Willingness to Accept Compensation’ assessment methodology.  
Essentially, these are techniques that seek to measure the value that ordinary 
people attach to natural resources.  Individual willingness to pay for 
something, or to accept money in exchange for its loss, is seen as a means of 
attaching a contingent market value to things that do not normally admit 
market valuation.   
 
However, some hesitancy may be detected towards the ‘benefits’ approach to 
environmental cost assessment.  A footnote reference in the Information 
Sheet acknowledges that the relevance of the costs based approach to 
valuation of environmental damage depends on the character of the 
environmental standards relating to the target situation.   
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‘If these standards are fixed and non-negotiable (e.g. hands-off policy regarding a 
particular area) and based on the idea of ‘strong sustainability’ ‘one could argue that 
monetary valuation of the target situation is methodologically speaking pointless for 
the provision level of the associated (non-market) environmental goods and services 
at that point is not ‘for sale’.  Monetisation through WTP or WTAC measures assumes 
a priori inter-changeability (also referred to as ‘weak-sustainability) of non-market 
goods and services (e.g. environmental goods and services such as biodiversity of 
landscape amenities) and market goods and services (e.g. the amount of income 
people are willing to accept as compensation if the natural area is given up).’14 
 
More broadly, the Information Sheet acknowledges that all valuation 
techniques have strengths and weaknesses.  All methods involve some 
uncertainty and it is suggested that it may be possible to use more than one 
valuation technique and to compare the results.  The reluctance to opt for a 
single methodology for the assessment of environmental costs may seem 
indecisive and unhelpful to those entrusted with this task at national levels.  
Alternatively, it may be seen as reflecting the seemingly intractable difficulties 
involved in undertaking this exercise in practice.   
 
In summary, it is evident that none of the methods that have been proposed 
for valuing environmental damage are entirely satisfactory.  The costs-based 
approach presupposes that the cost of preventing environmental damage and 
the cost of its rectification are the same thing.  The benefits-based approach 
is based upon the rather dubious supposition that environmental quality and 
ecosystems can be characterised as market commodities and financially 
quantified at a price that is somehow revealed by a survey of the hypothetical 
preferences of individuals.  The hopeful position initially adopted by the 
Commission Communication was that, with sufficient endeavour, suitably 
robust methodologies to assess environmental costs would materialise.  This 
may be seen as contrasting with a view that the environment is intrinsically 
valuable but, in principle, not capable of market valuation.  If so, the exercise 
of attempting the impossible is bound to fail.   
 
6. Interpretation of the Polluter Pays Principle 
 
The final part of the discussion examines how cost recovery pricing for water 
services applies the PPP.  It will be recalled that cost recovery pricing is to be 
in accordance with the PPP and the adequate contribution of water uses is to 
take into account the principle (Article 9(1)).  A difficulty in assessing how this 
is to be done arises because of the ambiguity of the principle.  A compelling 
environmental campaigning slogan does not necessarily translate into a 
practicable legal norm which can be formulated with the precision needed for 
legal certainty as to its sphere of application.  In the case of the PPP, its 
apparent simplicity masks a range of difficulties in its interpretation and 
application.   
 
Taken literally, the polluter pays principle might be spelt out as follows: a 
person who is responsible for pollution of the environment must pay the cost 
of the resulting environmental damage.  If understood in this way, translation 
of the principle into a workable legal norm requires: (1) a definition of what is 
                                            
14 Footnote 8 to Information Sheet.   
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to count as ‘pollution’; (2) an identification of who is the ‘polluter’; (3) a means 
of assessing the financial ‘cost’ of environmental damage; and (4) the 
identification of the body to whom the payment is to be made, perhaps subject 
to a requirement that it should actually be used to make good the 
environmental damage.15   
 
However, there are serious uncertainties inherent in each of these stages in 
the interpretation of the PPP.  Beyond that, in some circumstances there are 
profound doubts as to whether environmental damage is genuinely capable of 
being made good by payment of money or whether it is ethically defensible to 
allow environmental damage to be ‘condoned’ and somehow ‘legitimised’ 
simply by being paid for.  If an aim of sustainable development is to preserve 
the environment for future generations, it is difficult to see how environmental 
destruction could be justified purely on the basis that its loss had been 
sufficiently ‘paid for’ at the time it occurred. 
 
Conceivably, making headway against intractable difficulties of this kind might 
be possible through an enquiry into the underlying purpose that the PPP is 
intended to achieve.  However, a scan of the legal literature at European level 
reveals diverse attempts to formulate the PPP with significantly different 
objectives in mind.  A study of OECD Council Recommendations, European 
Community Council Recommendations and statements drawn from 
Community Action Programmes on the Environment reveals the shifting 
meaning of the PPP over time.  Hence, in different formulations the PPP has 
been seen as having:  
(1) an economic integration function, in avoiding distortion of competition 
through preventing state aid being used to finance anti-pollution investment;  
(2) a redistributive function, in internalising the cost of polluting impacts;  
(3) a preventative function, in encouraging or requiring potential polluters to 
meet the costs of pollution abatement; and  
(4) a restorative function, in allocating the cost of environmental remediation.16   
These differing possible functions of the PPP are not necessarily exclusive of 
one another, but do place markedly different emphases upon the different 
potential purposes that the principle may be seeking to achieve.   
 
In the context of the cost recovery obligation under Article 9 of the WFD, the 
version of the PPP that is referred to must be taken to be that provided for 
under the EC Treaty and this must serve as a starting point for discussion.  
Under the Treaty, the intention is that progression towards sustainable 
development is to be facilitated through the application of more specific 
environmental principles that are stated to provide the basis for the 
Community’s environment policy.  Specifically, that policy is to be based on 
‘the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventative action 
should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified 
at source and that the polluter should pay’.17 (Art.174(2)).  However, the 
Treaty provides no definition or elaboration of the meaning of these principles 
or any indication as to their respective gravity or interrelationship.  Hence, the 
                                            
15 Vandekerckhove [10].   
16 de Sadeleer [3].   
17 EC Treaty Art.174(2).   
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meaning of the PPP and its role, alongside the other environmental policy 
principles, is a matter of considerable speculation.   
 
In interpreting the EC Treaty, it is not generally possible to ‘look behind’ the 
text for background information as to the meaning of obscure provisions.  
Hence, the European Court of Justice is unwilling to have recourse to the 
legislative history of a provision, since this may lead to conflicting 
interpretations.  Even previous Community measures relating to the PPP18 
may not be relevant to the interpretation of wording that has subsequently 
been adopted in the Treaty.  Words in the Treaty need to be interpreted 
according to their ordinary meaning, and only where that wording is unclear 
do the context and objectives of the provision become relevant.  Secondary 
legislation,19 and its interpretation by the Court,20 may provide a guide to the 
interpretation of Treaty provisions, but in the case of the PPP principle there is 
little that can be drawn from this.   
 
On that basis, a relatively early analysis of the PPP, as provided for in the EC 
Treaty, concluded that the principle may be characterised as follows. 
 
‘Community action in environmental matters shall proceed on the basis that the costs 
for removing environmental pollution in cases where existing provisions have not 
been adhered to are in principle to be borne by the emittor.  The burden of such costs 
is only to be imposed on the general public by way of exception.  Exceptions can be 
formulated differently for the various regions.’   
 
A further inference from this analysis was that there is ‘pollution’ only where 
Community legislation has laid down legal rules on nuisance to the 
environment and these limits have been exceeded.  In addition, it was 
stressed that the PPP contains no element that obliges an emitter to take 
preventative measures to minimise emissions.21  Hence, on this view, a 
distinct separation is maintained between the PPP, concerned with 
rectification of past environmental damage, and the prevention principle, 
concerned with avoidance of future damage.   
 
The limitation in the scope of PPP to the redress of past environmental 
damage, and the exclusion of preventative action from its remit, are significant 
points which seem to follow logically from a reading of the EC Treaty.  The 
                                            
18 For example, prior to its adoption in the EEC Treaty under the Single European Act in 1987, 
the PPP, was referred to in the First Environmental Action Programme (OJ 1973 C112/1) 
which stated that ‘the cost of preventing and eliminating nuisances to the environment must in 
principle be borne by the polluter’; and has been referred to in all subsequent Action 
Programmes.  The PPP was also considered in 1975 Council Recommendation (75/436 OJ 
1975 L194/1) on the allocation of costs and intervention by public authorities in the case of 
environmental measures.   
19 The PPP was implicit in early secondary legislation on waste (Directives 75/442 and 
78/319) providing that the costs of the safe disposal of waste are to fall on the holder of the 
waste, a previous holder, or the producer of the products from which was the result.  Directive 
84/631, on transport of waste, provided for the costs of transporting to fall upon the holder.   
20 Case C-293/97 Standley [1999] ECR I-02603 provides some discussion of the application 
of the PPP, but is mainly concerned with the need for its ‘proportional’ application (see paras. 
51 to 52).   
21 Kramer [5].   
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incorporation of four different environmental policy principles in the Treaty 
(precaution, prevention, rectification at source, and polluter pays) would 
suggest that these are intended to have distinct meanings.  Preventative 
action would clearly be justified under the preventative principle, but not under 
the PPP.  The distinct purposes of the different principles are usefully kept in 
mind.  If this interpretation remains valid, the cost recovery obligations under 
the WFD must be interpreted as being concerned solely with recovery of costs 
for past environmental damage.  That is, taking account of the PPP does not 
extend to the imposition of cost recovery for preventative action.  Clearly, it 
might have been possible for Article 9 of the WFD to have made reference to 
the preventative principle, or possibly the rectification at source principle, but it 
does not and this omission seems significant.   
 
On the other hand, a markedly contrasting interpretation of the remit of the 
PPP is to be drawn from the Environmental Liability Directive.22 (2004/35).  
Recital 18 of this Directive reads as follows. 
 
According to the ‘polluter-pays’ principle, an operator causing environmental damage 
or creating an imminent threat of such damage should, in principle, bear the cost of 
the necessary preventative or remedial measures. . .  
 
This seems to affirm the exact opposite of what has been suggested above, in 
assimilating the PPP and prevention principle, or taking the PPP to 
incorporate a justification for prevention as well as remediation.  Certainly, the 
Environmental Liability Directive makes numerous references to the need for 
‘prevention’ of different kinds of environmental harm, but the apparent 
consolidation of different environmental policy principles raises the question 
whether a similar approach is needed towards water service cost recovery 
under the WFD, opening the possibility that prevention, as well as remediation 
of environmental damage, may be within its the scope.  If so, this might 
provide a justification of a cost-based approach to assessment of 
environmental damage of the kind discussed in the Information Sheet on 
Environmental and Resource Costs.  What is most unfortunate, however, is 
that, in the context of the cost recovery obligations under the WFD, radically 
contrasting ways of interpreting PPP seem almost equally plausible.   
 
7. Concluding Observations 
 
A common criticism of environmental law is that it fails to keep pace with 
contemporary concerns.  Regulation concerned with ‘industrial’ environmental 
problems may be seen as backward-looking in its failure to anticipate and 
address the present and future environmental challenges confronting post-
industrial societies.  The provisions for cost recovery under the WFD are, if 
anything, subject to the opposite kind of criticism.  They impose well-
intentioned legal obligations without clarification of the fundamental ideas 
upon which they are based (the meaning of PPP) and in advance of 
establishing a satisfactory methodology for their implementation (in respect of 
the assessment of environmental and resource costs).  Whilst the measures 
                                            
22 Directive 2004/35/CE on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying 
of environmental damage, OJ L143/56, 30 April 2004.   
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concerning recovery of financial costs may be beneficial and practicable, the 
balance between the costs and the environmental benefits of the more 
ambitious aspects of water services cost recovery obligations are, at best, 
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